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ABSTRACT
The increased popularity and ubiquitous availability of on-
line social networks and globalised Internet access have af-
fected the way in which people share content. The informa-
tion that users willingly disclose on these platforms can be
used for various purposes, from building consumer models
for advertising, to inferring personal, potentially invasive,
information.
In this work, we use Twitter, Instagram and Foursquare
data to convey the idea that the content shared by users,
especially when aggregated across platforms, can potentially
disclose more information than was originally intended.
We perform two case studies: First, we perform user de-
anonymization by mimicking the scenario of finding the iden-
tity of a user making anonymous posts within a group of
users. Empirical evaluation on a sample of real-world social
network profiles suggests that cross-platform aggregation in-
troduces significant performance gains in user identification.
In the second task, we show that it is possible to infer
physical location visits of a user on the basis of shared Twit-
ter and Instagram content. We present an informativeness
scoring function which estimates the relevance and novelty
of a shared piece of information with respect to an inference
task. This measure is validated using an active learning
framework which chooses the most informative content at
each given point in time. Based on a large-scale data sam-
ple, we show that by doing this, we can attain an improved
inference performance. In some cases this performance ex-
ceeds even the use of the user’s full timeline.
Keywords
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1. INTRODUCTION
User privacy is a topic that has increasingly gained trac-
tion with the rise of online social networks (OSN). These
platforms allow users to communicate, connect with peers
and share content. Originally, OSNs mainly focused on
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these core aspects, but nowadays the term also includes plat-
forms which are primarily user-centric, allowing members
to broadcast personal thoughts and content. In 2010, [13]
find OSNs among the most frequently visited Web sites for
a large population of users. Due to their prevalence and
abundance in personal content, OSNs lend themselves to
the study of human behavior at scale [14].
Recent successful initial public offerings (IPO) and high
market valuations underline the monetary value of OSNs.
However, the relation between the number of registered users,
their online activity, and these valuations is not entirely
clear. It has been shown in several studies that user char-
acteristics, such as personality traits [12] or future route
intentions [15], can be reliably inferred from corresponding
OSN profiles. Although the general value of personal data
is widely accepted, there have not been many studies which
assign a tangible value to OSN profiles. As a consequence,
both for users as well as platform providers, the value of in-
formation remains a vague notion, at best. This situation is
detrimental both to users who cannot be expected to make
informed decisions about privacy controls, as long as they do
not know the value and potential risk of disclosing a given
information item, as well as platform and service providers
who blindly buy and sell user data in bulk instead of sav-
ing resources by concentrating on select relevant portions of
information.
In this paper, we aim to draw attention to accidental pri-
vacy leakage through content sharing in online social net-
works and make a first step toward describing a formal met-
ric of task-specific informativeness of pieces of shared con-
tent.
Our empirical study relies on three popular OSN plat-
forms: (1) Twitter, a microblogging platform whose main
content comes in tweets, posts limited to 140 characters
which can contain text, media (video or images), links to
external Web sites, references to other users and hashtags
(terms starting with the # symbol, which are used to mark
keywords or topics in a tweet). (2) Instagram, a photo shar-
ing platform. Its main content are visual in nature along
with optional textual descriptors. (3) Foursquare, a location
service platform concentrating on the notion of check-ins.
Check-ins correspond to real-world venues that the user has
visited. In addition to the venue name, more information
such as location and venue categories are available.
Our investigation is driven by the following research ques-
tions:
1. How well can we uniquely identify a user based on
matching a set of unseen posts to a user’s online foot-
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print and is there a benefit in modelling user identities
across more than one OSN?
2. For the same user, is the information posted in one
OSN indicative of the information contained in another
OSN?
3. Can we quantify the amount of new information that
a piece of shared content carries, with respect to a
concrete inference task?
In particular, to address RQ 1, we mimic the following
scenario: let us have a collection of users’ online footprints
and a set of q anonymous posts. We test whether we are able
to correctly find the author of the anonymous posts based
on seeing part of their online footprint.
As for RQ 2 and 3, we consider that a user may uninten-
tionally expose personal information through seemingly in-
nocuous shared content. For example, when a user shares a
venue check-in, it is easy to infer which venue category was
visited. However, a post which does not mention a place
explicitly might still contain information about a potential
behaviour or visit intention. Consider two tweets from the
same user: “Lol should start heading to the gym #fitness”
and “What a great sunny day!”. It is clear that the first
tweet contains more information about the user’s intention
to visit a venue type than the second. To this end, we devise
an informativeness metric for shared content. The metric ex-
plicitly models the item’s relevancy towards a given inference
task as well as its novelty in comparison to the previously
seen timeline. Such a score can serve as an indication of the
amount of novel information disclosure associated with an
information item and can, in the future help both service
providers as well as privacy advocates in making informed
decisions.
This paper makes three novel contributions beyond the
state of the art:
1. We formulate a scoring function to quantify the infor-
mation value of shared content from the perspective
of improving the performance of a concrete inference
task.
2. We present a practical way of exploiting the theoretical
model by integration into an active learning scheme
that results in enhanced user model learning rates.
3. In both practical settings, we put particular emphasis
on cross-platform models of user identity
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Sec-
tion 2 gives an overview of related work dedicated to user
modelling as well as privacy protection in Web scenarios.
On the basis of a parallel corpus of OSN profiles belonging
to the same natural person, Section 4 discusses unique user
identification methods employing intra-platform as well as
cross-platform information. Section 5 formally describes an
informativeness score for shared OSN content and applies it
to the task of predicting user traits manifested on one plat-
form based on the user’s activity on other OSNs. Finally,
Section 6 concludes with a brief discussion of our main find-
ings as well as an outlook on ongoing and future extensions
to this work.
2. RELATEDWORK
There is a wealth of work dedicated to privacy protection
in Web information systems such as search engines or social
networks. A number of early studies investigate the com-
mon privacy concerns of information system users [17, 18,
16, 9], finding that general concerns are abundant among
Internet users but remain vague and imprecise. Many users
are aware of the information collection and behavioral profil-
ing activities undertaken by service providers as well as the
wide range of data-driven inference efforts that have been
presented by the academic and industrial communities [15,
12]. In spite of this knowledge, however, even technology-
affine users cannot reliably quantify the exact risks entailed
by careless information disclosure.
Privacy concerns become especially prevalent in mobile
computing environments [11]. De Montjoye et al. [6] show
that as few as four hourly GPS samples are enough to uniquely
identify 95% of all individuals in a 500k-user phone log. We
encounter an even greater potential for privacy hazards in
settings that go beyond raw positional traces, joining them
with topical information, e.g., in Web search queries [19] or
contextual advertising [1].
To counter such de-anonymization and tracking efforts,
various strategies have been proposed. Dwork’s concept of
differential privacy [7] considers adding -noise to aggregate
queries that prevents singling out individual contributions to
the overall aggregate. Similarly, Carpineto and Romano [4]
rely on the notion of k-anonymity, ensuring that no query
should return less than k individual records. In the domain
of personal information, these approaches may not go far
enough since certain, frequent, characteristics that would
neither be detected under k-anonymity nor differential pri-
vacy could cause severe privacy hazards.
This paper, in spirit, follows the reasoning of Howard et
al. [10] by measuring not just the amount of information
contained in a given message, but also with respect to an
inference task which can be economically relevant. In this
way it attributes an economic dimension to messages, which
can be an interesting measure both for industry players as
well as for the message’s original author. On the basis of a
number of concrete classification tasks, this paper aims to
close the gap between the rich body of work on empirical
analysis of privacy hazards on the one hand and the large
range of available privacy protection measures on the other.
We argue that only by understanding the concrete implica-
tions of information disclosure (e.g., in the form of the value
of a piece of information) can users be expected to make ed-
ucated decisions about the appropriate protection measures
they are willing to take.
3. DATASET
As our research questions are concerned with the rela-
tionship between parallel user profiles of the same natural
person across different OSNs, we rely on the methodology
described in [8] to assemble our dataset. We obtain a collec-
tion of 618 distinct users who cross-post content from cor-
responding profiles in multiple social networks, totalling 1.1
million tweets, 18000 Instagram posts and 99000 Foursquare
check-ins.
4. USER DE-ANONYMIZATION
Our first use case is concerned with, given a number of
anonymous social media posts q and a collection of users U ,
finding the particular user u ∈ U that authored the posts.
Inspired by general text matching strategies [2], each user’s
known previous posts are described in the form of a unigram
language model Mu and the likelihood of said user having
authored the anonymous text q corresponds to p(Mu|q). Us-
ing Bayes’ law, one can write:
p(u|q) = p(q|u)p(u)
p(q)
(1)
And to select the most likely user:
arg max
u∈U
p(q|u) (2)
To simplify the expression further, we assume that p(q)
is constant for all users and treat p(u) as uniform across all
u ∈ U . Thus, we find the most likely user by estimating
p(q|u), the probability of posts q being generated by the
language model derived from u’s available timeline.
These timelines are projected into a n-dimentional TF-
IDF weighted vector space. To preserve the natural way
in which users write, no further vocabulary pre-processing
(such as lemmatization or exclusion of less common words)
was applied. Based on this representation, we estimate
p(q|u) as the product across all terms t in the vocabulary:
p(q|u) ∝
∏
t∈V
p(t|Mu) (3)
As described in Section 3, the dataset contains the on-
line footprint of the same user on Twitter, Instagram and
Foursquare. To mimic the described task, textual data from
one OSN is used as the source of anonymous posts and the
textual data from the remaining two OSNs is used to gen-
erate the user language model p(Mu|q).
To generate the training data, randomly sampled sections
of varying length from the training source are used to gener-
ate pairs of the form (Mu, user). For the test set, we remove
any form of user mentions to mimic an anonymous post.
Our experiments investigate a number of combinations of
(training, test) data sources:
1. (Twitter, Twitter)
2. (Twitter + Foursquare + Instagram, Twitter)
3. (Twitter, Foursquare)
4. (Twitter + Instagram, Foursquare)
5. (Twitter, Instagram)
6. (Twitter + Foursquare, Instagram)
For the first two cases, we split the Twitter timeline into
separate training and test portions. However, the more in-
teresting conditions are 3-6, as the source of anonymous
posts does not come from the data source used to gener-
ate the language model.
Additionally, we vary the amount of available profiling in-
formation by successively revealing larger parts of the train-
ing data. Furthermore, we also study the impact of changing
the size of the set of anonymous posts q.
Multiple training sources are combined (Conditions 2, 4,
and 6) in the following way: for a fixed amount of available
Figure 1: F-1 score curve of classifiers for conditions
1-2 varying sample size and training data size
Figure 2: F-1 score curve of classifiers for conditions
3-4 varying sample size and training data size
profiling information, 20% of it is made up from Instagram
or Foursquare data (or 40% if these are put in together)
and the rest from Twitter, due to the relative abundance of
Twitter data.
The performance of our classifier is given by accuracy of
predicting the correct user who generated the anonymous
posts. The results are averaged across 10 randomization
runs.
In Figures 1-3, the micro averaged F-1 score curves for the
classifiers built under different conditions are shown.
In Table 1, the results for Conditions 1-2 can be found. We
note that the usage of additional OSNs does not improve the
de-anonymization performance. This is not too surprising
as the source of the anonymous posts come from Twitter.
The results for Conditions 3-4 can be found in Table 2. We
remark that the classifier’s performance does not improve
with the addition of Instagram data as users can cross-post
check-ins on Twitter and users can check-in into a venue
multiple times.
The more interesting results can be found in Table 3,
which presents the results for Conditions 5-6. We note that
in this case, as training and test data come from different
sources, there is some improvement in the de-anonymization
performance when we include Instagram data as an extra
training source.
With respect to RQ 1, we note that it is possible to match
Figure 3: F-1 score curve of classifiers for conditions
5-6 varying sample size and training data size
Table 1: User de-anonymization for different sizes
of training and test data, using Twitter as a source
for anonymous posts
# anonymous posts
Train Source Posts Seen 1 5 15 20
Twitter
50 18.21 47.80 69.90 74.22
100 19.19 48.85 71.41 76.96
200 18.45 48.68 71.57 77.03
500 19.59 49.32 73.23 77.96
1000 20.24 49.83 73.34 78.23
Twitter
Instagram
Foursquare
50 17.56 46.17 69.82 73.24
100 18.38 47.88 71.24 75.82
200 18.78 48.35 72.23 77.69
500 18.16 50.84 72.97 77.87
1000 19.90 49.39 72.81 76.66
Table 2: User de-anonymization for different sizes
of training and test data, using Foursquare data as
a source for anonymous posts
# anonymous posts
Train Source Posts Seen 1 5 15 20
Twitter
50 32.43 54.97 61.33 62.34
100 33.17 58.35 63.24 63.10
200 34.51 60.85 67.40 67.89
500 35.81 62.41 67.50 68.94
1000 36.91 61.58 67.88 67.06
Twitter
Instagram
50 32.68 55.72 61.87 62.80
100 33.16 58.43 64.14 66.01
200 36.56 60.34 66.84 69.02
500 37.58 62.24 69.17 69.04
1000 35.00 62.57 66.92 67.95
user profiles across OSNs based only on their textual data,
achieving a maximum accuracy of 77.96% when using only
500 posts (the equivalent of 20% of the average length of
the Twitter timelines at our disposition). Furthermore, the
usage of multiple OSNs as training data source seems to im-
prove the classifiers’ performance when the source of anony-
mous posts and training data are distinct, suggesting there
is a consistency in user language and vocabulary across the
chosen OSNs. We also observe that, in general, the more
anonymous posts are available, the better the performance
of the designed classifier becomes.
Table 3: User de-anonymization for different sizes
of training and test data, using Instagram data as a
source for anonymous posts
# anonymous posts
Train Source Posts Seen 1 5 15 20
Twitter
50 17.44 35.12 49.22 52.32
100 19.07 40.17 55.51 59.82
200 20.77 41.71 58.06 60.07
500 20.75 41.27 58.34 61.74
1000 21.00 40.15 55.62 60.34
Twitter
Foursquare
50 18.05 35.91 51.20 53.17
100 18.28 38.44 55.01 57.12
200 21.70 44.81 60.90 64.50
500 22.55 44.02 60.40 63.78
1000 21.87 41.85 60.42 63.26
5. INFORMATION VALUATION
Let us again start from an OSN user base U , in which
each user u is defined by the set of his associated timelines
{Mku}Kk=1. Further, let S be an OSN such that we can de-
fine the set of all posts made by u in S as his timeline, MSu .
We treat the timeline as a long consecutive piece of text in
which each post constitutes a sentence. We use information
from the timeline to estimate the probability of a user man-
ifesting a certain property A. This probability is denoted by
p(A|Mu), where A denotes “u shows Property A” and Mu
is the user’s timeline. Due to our definition of timelines,
the same method can be used for full timelines or subsets
of posts. Regardless of the chosen scope, we now project
the timeline into an n-dimensional TF-IDF weighted vector
space that allows us to train a classifier CA, estimating the
final p(A|Mu).
5.1 Measuring informativeness
Our objective is to find a function which quantifies the
information carried in a post. On the one hand, we are
interested in capturing the relevance of a post with respect
to a certain inference task, on the other hand, in order to
avoid redundancy or attributing a high score to already seen
information, we are interested in capturing the novelty of
some content with respect to what is already known. In a
spirit similar to [5], we model the information content in two
ways:
• Relevance ρ of the post with respect to an inference
task or a set of tasks;
• Novelty ν of the post with respect to the user’s previ-
ously posted content.
We form our informativeness score as a convex combina-
tion between these two quantities, thus introducing a mix-
ture parameter λ ∈ [0, 1]. Now, for each newly authored
post m, we can define an informativeness function I : Rn ×
Rn × C → R+ as follows:
I(m,Mu, C) = λ ν(m,Mu)
+ (1− λ) ρ(m, C) (4)
5.1.1 Relevance
Measuring the relevance of shared content can be intu-
itively thought of as determining which piece of shared con-
tent contains features that are important for the classifier’s
decision. A popular choice of such a function describing fea-
ture importance is the Gini Importance (Ig). For a feature
θ, the Gini Importance for a classifier C is defined as:
IgC(θ) =
∑
T
∑
τ
∆iθ(τ, T ). (5)
Where τ is a node, T a decision tree and ∆i(τ) the de-
crease in Gini Impurity. The Gini Importance indicates how
often a particular feature θ was selected for a split, and how
large its overall discriminative value was for a particular clas-
sification problem. We estimate the overall relevance ρ of a
post by summing up the importance scores across features
contained in the post ~m ∈ Rn:
ρ(~m, C) =
n∑
i=0
Igc(mi)
5.1.2 Novelty
For a fixed u ∈ U and OSN S, let ~m1, ~m2 ∈ Rn be the
vector representation of shared contents m1, m2 ∈MSu , the
user’s timeline.
Informally, the function novelty : Rn × Rn → R+ should
have the following properties:
1. ~m2 should have low novelty if it is contained in ~m1.
2. ~m2 should have low novelty if it is similar to ~m1.
3. ~m2 should have high novelty if it is distinct from ~m1.
Let ~m1 be denoted as (m1,1, ...,m1,n). The proposed func-
tion to measure novelty is the following: Let ν: Rn ×Rn →
R+, be a non-symmetric function defined by:
ν( ~m1, ~m2) =
n∑
i=1
exp(−α(|mi,1|+ |m2,i| − 1))
n∑
i=1
1[m2,i 6= 0]
(6)
For each word, the novelty function decays with the num-
ber of times that the word appears. By regulating α we can
control how many times we have to observe a word to not
consider it novel anymore.
5.2 Experimental Setup
As a concrete example of the general data-driven label
prediction problem introduced previously, we turn towards
the task of predicting whether a person will visit a particular
type of location (e.g., an Italian restaurant or a golf course)
based on their social network timeline(s). These timelines
are projected into a TF-IDF-weighted vector space. The
vocabulary is curated by: removing all links and user men-
tions, stop words, words which occur less than 5 times and,
when possible, word lemmatisation using WordNet. For the
prediction task, we use the AdaBoost algorithm [3] with de-
cision trees as weak learners as our classifier since they gener-
ally work well without refined parameter tuning. The classi-
fier’s performance is evaluated under 10-fold cross-validation.
We begin by training one binary classifier per venue type
that decides whether or not a user’s timeline suggests they
are likely to visit that type of location. For every test user
u, we initiate the procedure by randomly sampling a single
post from their timeline Sk and create a truncated timeline.
Then, at each iteration, we sample a constant number d of
Figure 4: Percentage of users visiting different venue
types
posts from the timeline, add them to the truncated timeline
and make a prediction using this iteratively updated input
vector. The procedure is iterated until user u has no more
posts left (or until the truncated timeline reaches a fixed
amount of posts). We obtain an ordered sequence of predic-
tions: (y0, y1, ..., ynend), where nend represents the number
of iterations. When d = 1, i.e., we add one post at a time,
we simulate the situation in which an existing user profile is
updated over time as new content is being shared.
We aggregate results taking into account the varying time-
line length across users in the following way: the maximum
timeline length nlmax is calculated. Then, for each user
whose timeline is shorter than nlmax , the last prediction
ynend is repeated to generate a sequence of predictions of
length nlmax . As a performance baseline, we randomly sam-
ple posts to be added. In the active method, instead, we
select the posts which are most informative according to
our metric presented in the previous section.
Foursquare offers a hierarchical taxonomy of places that
display very different relative popularity. Figure 4 plots the
percentage of our user population that has visited each of the
more than 500 categories. We can note that the distribution
is heavily skewed. While virtually all users have, at some
point, visited places that fall into broad categories such as
[Arts & Entertainment ] or [Food ], others are so specific that
they remain almost empty (e.g., [South Tyrolean Restau-
rants] or [Hunting Supplies]). For the purpose of venue pre-
diction, we are forced to make a subselection of categories
that are neither so broad that the prediction task would be-
come trivial nor so specific that the classifier would not find
sufficiently many training examples. For this reason, we fo-
cus on those categories that were visited by 25% to 35% of
the population, giving us a set of 37 venues (highlighted in
yellow in the figure).
5.3 Results
5.3.1 Cross OSN
Each user’s timeline is initialized with a single post to
which we iteratively add additional, randomly sampled, posts
to form an updated user model. Figure 5, shows the classifier
performance as a function of the number of posts available to
the user model. From this overview, we note three recurring
slope patterns. Some venue-specific classifiers quickly reach
their optimal performance after as few as 750 posts have
been observed (top figure), for others, significantly more it-
erations are required (center figure), and lastly, for some
particular venues, the classification accuracy hardly bene-
fits at all from using more posts (bottom figure). We refer
to these three situations as quick-to-learn, slow-to-learn and
hard-to-learn venues, respectively. Figure 6 gives a complete
overview of the relative frequency of mentions of the chosen
venue categories and their affiliation to the three slope types.
The general tendency seems to be that frequently mentioned
venues tend to be quicker to learn than rare ones, while
hard-to-learn venues appear to be randomly spread across
the observation frequency range.
5.3.2 Active resource selection
After having confirmed the intuitive assumption that (within
the limits of our three slope types) more data results in more
accurate predictions, we now proceed to describing an active
selection scenario in which we expand the user model by the
most informative posts according to our metric rather than
random ones. To this end, we fix the novelty parameter α
at 0.5, meaning that after a word appears 5 times, its nov-
elty becomes negligible. Table 4 highlights this method’s
performance at different settings of λ. 50 posts are actively
selected for this experiment and we note that our selection
scheme biased towards informativeness delivers significantly
better F1 performance
1 than the random selection baseline
at all parameter settings. The overall best performance was
obtained at a setting of λ = 0.1, where the score mixture
is dominated by feature importance while still taking into
account novelty.
Table 4: Average classifier performance across all 37
venue types, for different λ.
λ F1-score Precision Recall
baseline 15.36 52.78 8.99
0.0 42.10 44.21 40.18
0.1 44.19 46.64 41.97
0.2 44.16 46.57 41.98
0.3 43.63 46.00 41.48
0.4 43.66 46.09 41.47
0.5 43.23 45.50 41.18
0.6 43.80 46.31 41.56
0.7 43.55 46.85 40.69
0.8 42.78 45.72 40.19
0.9 42.21 45.99 39.00
1.0 18.95 43.38 12.12
Let us return to our previously introduced categorization
of learning curve slope types. Table 5 shows the influence of
λ on the performance of the three slope categories. We ob-
serve clearly diverging tendencies between quick and slow-
to-learn venues. While quick-to-learn venues benefit from
low novelty contributions, their more slowly evolving coun-
terparts benefit from novelty-biased informativeness scores.
Examples can be seen in Figure 7. Again, hard-to-learn
venue types do not show any noticeable response to differ-
ent choices of λ, as long as the relevance component is not
fully turned off.
Furthermore, for some particular venues, the classifier at-
tained a better performance when using only 50 actively
selected posts than when using the full timeline of the users.
Some examples can be found in Table 6.
Regarding RQ 2, we show again that there is consistency
in terms of content shared across OSNs, in particular, we
show that is is possible to predict venue type visits based
on what is shared on Twitter and Instagram. Furthermore,
1Average F1 score for all classifiers is computed using the
average of precision and recall across all classifiers.
Figure 5: Venue-dependent classifier learning rates
across training iterations.
Figure 6: Average percentage of venue type mentions per twitter timeline, when user has visited the venue
type with category assignment of quick, slow or hard to learn for venue types.
Figure 7: Example of venue types which benefit
from novelty component. Top figure: venue type
Brewery. Bottom figure: Resort
Table 5: Average F1-scores across slope types.
λ Quick Slow Hard
0.0 47.81 38.51 36.70
0.2 50.16 40.40 38.43
0.4 49.83 40.10 37.23
0.6 49.59 40.18 38.48
0.8 46.97 41.19 36.97
1.0 17.87 9.70 30.48
with respect to RQ 3, we show that using our designed met-
ric, we can find the posts which are most relevant to predict
venue type visits. In particular, using the active learning
framework with our information measure of content in posts
as selection criteria, we observe overall quicker learning rates
and in some cases, we can use a significantly reduced the
number of posts to attain a classifier performance which is
comparable to using the full timeline of the user.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied privacy hazards pertaining to
cross-platform social network usage. Individually innocuous
posts can lead to leakage of critical information when aggre-
gated along or across a user’s OSN profiles. We quantify this
effect in two experiments: (1) uniquely identifying users in
an anonymous pool and (2) predicting user properties man-
ifested on one OSN platform based on content from other
parallel profiles.
In the user de-anonymization task, we note that it is pos-
sible to match user profiles across OSNs based only on their
textual data, with as little as 10% to 20% of the user’s full
timeline. Furthermore, the inclusion of multiple OSNs as
training data sources has been shown to improve the classi-
fiers’ performance when the source of anonymous posts and
training data are distinct. This suggests that there is a con-
sistency in user language and vocabulary across OSNs.
In the information valuation task, we propose a general-
purpose metric of textual informativeness in order to model
the value of shared information items both for service providers
(predictive power) as well as the user (potential privacy haz-
Table 6: Classifier performance using a truncated timeline versus a full timeline.
Sushi Rest. Cocktail Bar Gastropub Brewery Nightclub
Full timeline 52.86 31.48 38.53 50.88 43.40
Truncated + Random Selection 11.49 4.97 5.36 21.51 20.11
Truncated + Active Selection 61.72 55.84 54.79 66.15 54.23
ards). We show experimentally that the metric reflects the
relative importance of posts with respect to the inference
task being performed. When actively selecting a subset of
posts per user, this method was always able to beat a ran-
dom selection baseline. While choosing posts according to
their relevance seems to lead to better performance in gen-
eral, we noted that only for some venues there was a notice-
able benefit in including a strong novelty component in the
information scoring function.
This work focused on showing the privacy hazards that
arise from sharing content which seems uninformative or
harmless. In the future, we are excited to extend this line
of work by a dedicated investigation of information valua-
tion scores on the user side (e.g., of an OSN) as it would
greatly help people understand their own digital footprint
and enable them to recognize moments of critical informa-
tion disclosure. Furthermore, part of this work focused on
proposing a metric for information valuation with respect to
an inference task. We are interested to extend this line of
work by an in-vivo study of monetary efficiency of advertis-
ers as a consequence of introducing an informativeness-aware
resource selection scheme in their real-time bidding (RTB)
pipelines.
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